Abstract
I. Introduction
What factors were behind the crisis of capital accumulation in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s and what are the implications for the country's current macroeconomic strategies? In this paper, I present an empirical argument suggesting that an examination of the institutional and political stability of the apartheid economy provides a basis for understanding the dynamics of post-World War II capitalist development in South Africa. Because of its focus on institutional stability, the paper contributes to the literature on the existence of an apartheid social structure of accumulation in which economic and political institutions are important determinants of investment.
Previous studies have adopted approaches akin to a social structure of accumulation analysis for South Africa in an attempt to explain the country's rapid rate of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s and the emergence of an economic crisis in the mid-1970s (Gelb 1991, Morris and Padayachee 1988) . These efforts have been criticized for failing to subject their arguments to empirical scrutiny, particularly with respect to observed trends of declining profitability (Natrass 1994 (Natrass , 1992 . However, as this paper demonstrates, empirical analysis of the determinants of investment suggests that political instability was the primary cause of the crisis of accumulation in South Africa, independent of other variables such as profitability and economic growth. Based on these findings, I argue that tensions between political stability, democratic reforms, and distributive outcomes (e.g. the level of profit) have determined the direction that macroeconomic policies have taken in the post-apartheid era.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the social structures of accumulation framework and shows why it is relevant to the case of South Africa. In particular, the institutional dynamics of the apartheid economy suggest a strong case can be made for an analysis of the impact of political instability on capital accumulation. Following this introduction, I present estimates of the determinants of investment in South Africa. Past criticisms of an apartheid social structure of accumulation have focused almost exclusively on falling profitability. The failure of apartheid's race-based policies to sustain high rates of profit suggests that its institutions were unable to support investment in the long-run. However, a broader analysis that includes additional variables, such as an index of political unrest, shows that such a narrow critique of an institutional analysis of capital accumulation is unwarranted. The fourth section extends 1 3 the analysis to the current macroeconomic policies adopted in South Africa. In particular, I argue that the use of market-oriented strategies to mitigate distributive conflicts has failed to revitalize the performance of the South African economy following the crisis years of apartheid. A short discussion concludes the paper.
II. The institutional setting for accumulation: South African apartheid
The social structure of accumulation framework is a theoretical tool that can be used to analyze the dynamics of capitalist economies in terms of the effects of economic and political institutions on the accumulation of fixed capital. The social structure of accumulation itself refers to a set of social, political, and economic institutions that supports capital accumulation. An effective social structure of accumulation promotes net investment and economic stability in the long-run -that is, across business cycles. However, the ability of a particular institutional environment to support accumulation decays over time as conflicts emerge and key institutions lose their integrity. A period of stagnation follows the collapse of a particular social structure of accumulation until a new set of institutions is developed that resolve the tensions and contradictions of the former regime.
The social structure of accumulation approach was first developed to explain long-swings of growth and decline in the history of capitalist development of the United States (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982) . From this starting point, the analysis was extended further and used to explain the post-World War II boom and decline in the U.S. and other advanced capitalist economies Weisskopf 1989, Glyn et al. 1990) . A similar theoretical framework -the French régulation school -has been used to analyze historic patterns of capital accumulation and changes in the labor process (Aglietta 1979 , Lipietz 1986 ). This work has provided insights into the relationship between social institutions and the dynamics of capitalist development.
Perhaps the most powerful criticism of the social structures of accumulation approach is that the theoretical framework risks falling into the trap of functionalismthat is, arguing that the institutions present during a period of rapid growth must have supported accumulation because the theoretical frameworks demands it. Careful empirical work is required to scrutinize the impact of institutional factors on capital accumulation and to weed out any spurious relationships. Therefore, the arguments in this paper are based on empirical estimates of the determinants of investment. Before discussing the formal evidence, however, it is helpful to review South Africa's economic performance and institutional dynamics during the apartheid period.
The decades immediately following the establishment of apartheid, after the Nationalist Party victory in the 1948 elections, were years of very high rates of capital accumulation. However, beginning in the mid-1970s the rate of capital accumulation began to decline. Despite a short-lived up-turn associated due to a speculative bubble in the international price of gold in the early 1980s, the rate of investment fell to extremely low levels for the remainder of the apartheid years. Figure 1 illustrates this dramatic change. The social structures of accumulation approach could be relevant to the case of apartheid South Africa, if (1) a set of stable institutions supporting accumulation could be identified for the "boom" years and (2) the ability of these institutions to support capital accumulation could be shown to have atrophied during the "crisis" years. An examination of the institutional underpinnings of the apartheid-era economy demonstrates that just such a set of core institutions can be described.
One subset of these institutions falls under the general category of direct state support for accumulation through industrial and macroeconomic policies. Investment subsidies, expansionary monetary policy, and an overvalued exchange rate effectively lowered the costs of accumulation by providing access to inexpensive credit and reducing the costs of domestic investment and imported capital. In certain sectors (e.g. transport, energy and communications), the apartheid state was directly involved in establishing and developing key enterprises. Monetary policy was aimed at maintaining adequate demand for goods and services, as opposed to targeting monetary aggregates or inflation, in order to ensure stable economic growth. Moreover, beginning in the mid-1960s, direct interventions in the form of credit controls and interest rate caps were introduced (De Kock 1978) .
In addition to direct state intervention, the roles played by specific financial institutions underwent a dramatic transformation during the early apartheid years which 5 expanded the scope for financial intermediation to foster accumulation.
2 Under the influence of nationalist organizations and with government support, the financial sector moved from a system dominated by banks in the British tradition (Standard Bank and Barclays, now First National), with an emphasis on short-term credit, to a heterogeneous system in which the expansion of other financial institutions (e.g. Volkskas, Sanlam, Nedbank) supported medium-and long-term credit for industrial expansion. (Jones 1992 , Verhoef 1992a , Verhoef 1992b ).
Apartheid labor markets were governed by a set of restrictive, race-based regulations. The two key labor market policies of this period were: (1) job reservations for whites and (2) influx controls which limited the supply black labor. Job reservationsthe "color-bar" -effectively restricted certain jobs to white workers. Influx controls limited the residential rights of the black population in urban areas and provided the institutional structure for the migrant labor system. The question of how apartheid labor policies affected the process of capitalist development has generated a great deal of research and controversy (for example, Wood 2000 , Wintrobe 1998 , Posel 1997 , Lundahl 1992 , Lipton 1985 , Porter 1978 , Wolpe 1972 . In particular, much of the debate has centered on the relationship between influx controls, job reservations, and profitability.
Theoretical models in the tradition of an efficiency wage framework have demonstrated that these apartheid policies could maintain a well-disciplined pool of labor at lower costs than would be possible with liberalized labor markets (Wood 2000 : Chapter 6, Wintrobe 1998 . The general argument goes as follows: under apartheid labor market policies, African workers who lost their jobs would not simply join the ranks of the unemployed. They could lose their residential rights and be removed from the formal labor market to the underdeveloped homelands. Therefore, the apartheid policies increased the costs of losing a job and allowed employers to discipline workers at lower cost than would otherwise have been the case.
Whether these policies supported high levels of profitability has been subject to extensive debate. Insofar as the benefits of lowering the price of black labor exceeded the costs of enforcement and the preferential treatment of whites, then aggregate profitability would be higher than under liberalized labor markets. However, there are potential problems. Individual firms would have an incentive to avoid complying with the policy and many frequently did so (Posel 1997 , Lipton 1985 . Gains in net profitability could be hard to sustain in the early post-War period which was characterized by increases in white wages (Hofmeyr 1994) . Higher wage premiums would raise labor costs and cut into profitability. In addition, turnover costs could undermine the effectiveness of dismissal as a labor discipline device, especially when employees acquired job-specific skills. Finally, the effect on profitability most likely differed by sector. Sectors that relied heavily on migrant labor (e.g. mining) were more likely to enjoy higher profits due to the apartheid labor market policies than sectors that relied on urbanized black labor (e.g. manufacturing).
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Nevertheless, these policies did maintain a stable wage distribution and formed an important element of the institutional structure of apartheid. Moreover, as will be demonstrated later, the ability of labor market policies to sustain extremely high levels of profitability is not the lynch pin of a viable institutional analysis of South African capital accumulation.
Perhaps the most critical elements of the institutional structure of the first decades of apartheid were those which maintained political, economic, and social stability. For example, a type of race-based welfare state extended high-quality public services, maintained near full-employment, and provided good jobs to white workers in order to secure their political support. The Bretton-Woods system guaranteed stable exchange rates and gold prices -gold being a major export and source of foreign exchange. In addition, the existence of white-minority regimes Rhodesia, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola helped to protect the political "legitimacy" of apartheid.
A brief exception to the general stability of apartheid institutions was the Sharpeville shooting in 1961 in which 69 people were killed during a protest over influx controls. Business confidence was shaken and investment declined, as can be seen in Figure 1 . However, the enforcement of politically repressive policies for blacks -such as bans on political organizations, prohibitions on unions, the imprisonment of political leaders, and the use of the police force for social control -was able to prevent large-scale social unrest until the 1970s.
This institutional stability is also reflected in the economic record. Relatively high levels of economic growth and growing employment opportunities, for both blacks and whites, characterized the first decades of apartheid (Terblanche and Natrass 1992) . In particular, the income distribution between the different groups that constituted the apartheid system of racial classification was remarkably constant. White share of income remained virtually unchanged for nearly fifty years, until the mid-1970s (Hofmeyr 1992 ).
These components of the institutional environment that characterized the years of rapid capital accumulation are summarized in Table 1 . The table further classifies the different institutions as primarily domestic or primarily international. Taken together, these features could constitute an apartheid-era social structure of accumulation.
The social structure of accumulation theory predicts that the ability of these institutions to support stable investment must have decayed during the crisis period. An argument can be made that this indeed was the case. Most importantly, domestic mass mobilization against apartheid increased uncertainty throughout the society. Perhaps the best-known event was the Soweto up-rising of June 1976, in which schoolchildren in the largest collection of townships outside of Johannesburg protested the government's efforts to make Afrikaans the language of instruction in the schools; the brutal crackdown that followed shocked the world and signaled a new era of intense domestic resistance. In the years following Soweto, organizations of civil society, including black trade unions, anti-apartheid activists, and community groups, increased the frequency of boycotts, demonstrations and stay-aways. In 1983, many came together to pool their energies and formed the United Democratic Front (UDF) to oppose the system of apartheid. Political unrest grew to such a level that P.W. Botha, then president of South Africa, declared a state of emergency in 1985. helped maintain an inexpensive pool of well-disciplined black labor while securing better jobs and collective bargaining rights for white workers. (6) A race-based welfare state that extended high quality public services and maintained near full-employment for whites. (7) Direct state involvement in the development and expansion of strategic enterprises in the transport, energy, and communications sectors, for example Telkom, Eskom, Transnet, and Sasol. International features (1) An over-valued exchange rate which made capital imports relatively inexpensive.
Exchange controls maintained stability. (2) Trade policies which supported a form of import-substitution industrialization. (3) The Bretton-Woods system which guaranteed a stable world gold price and demand for gold as a reserve asset. (4) White minority rule in the neighboring states of Namibia and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.
Moreover, the organizational strength of black trade unions began to grow, as did their influence over wage distributions. Rising black wages destabilized the white-black income distribution of previous decades. In 1979, black trade unions were legalized in the hope that calmer industrial relations would prevail; however, the number of industrial disputes skyrocketed after legalization.
Other changes, apart from general political unrest, were evident. Non-compliance among firms with the apartheid labor market regulations reached a high point in the 1970s and the policies themselves were eliminated in the 1980s (Lipton 1986 , Posel 1997 . In the environment of growing uncertainty, firms shifted to relying on internal financing of investment through retained earnings, instead of intermediated sources of credit. Furthermore, monetary policy underwent a fundamental change in the 1980s when tighter monetary policy and market-determined interest rates replaced the former policies of credit controls, interest rate caps, and monetary expansion. These changes resulted in higher real interest rates.
On the international front, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system introduced a private market for gold with a high degree of price volatility. In addition, maintaining a stable exchange rate regime for the rand proved increasingly difficult. Moreover, in 1975, following the collapse of the Salazar government in Portugal, Mozambique and Angola became independent and both countries experienced destabilizing civil wars. In 1980, white minority rule in Rhodesia ended and the new country of Zimbabwe was born.
In almost every respect, the institutional environment of the crisis years was fundamentally different than that of the early decades of apartheid. Therefore, a reasonable prima facie case can be made for investigating the institutional determinants of investment along the lines of a social structure of accumulation analysis for South Africa. However, the validity of such an analysis rests with the empirical evidence. I now turn to a more rigorous examination of the role of a key institutional element -social and political stability -as a contributor to the South African crisis of accumulation.
III. Distributive conflict, institutional instability, and investmentan empirical reappraisal of the accumulation crisis in South Africa.
A number of studies explore the role that profitability plays as a determinant of the rate of investment (Glyn 1997 , Marglin and Bhaduri 1990 , Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1989 , Kalecki 1965 . Profitability not only represents the claims of capital on the income streams generated by economic production. It also provides a source of internally-generate financial resources for investment using retained earnings (Fazzari and Mott 1986) . Therefore, distributive outcomes -in particular, the division of the value of output between capital and labor -directly influence the process of accumulation.
Empirical trends in the rate of profit in South Africa are at the core of Nicoli Nattrass's (1994 Nattrass's ( ,1992 critique of the application of social structures of accumulation arguments to South Africa. Nattrass demonstrates that the rate of change in profitability of the South African manufacturing sector, as measured by profit rates and profit shares, was generally negative in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s -the period of rapid capital accumulation. Although she acknowledges that South African profit rates were extraordinarily high during the first decades of the post-World War II era 3 , she points out that falling rates of profit indicate that apartheid institutions could not sustain a viable social structure of accumulation.
Any effort to apply an institutional analysis of capital accumulation to South Africa must take into account Nattrass's insights. Notwithstanding, there are some immediate problems with the critique. First, it relies on profitability trends in manufacturing. When both mining and manufacturing are considered, growth rates of profit share were negative on average for only one business cycle from 1948 to 1989. Second, no attempt is made to estimate the relationship between the rate of accumulation 9 and key variables, such as economic growth, the profit rate, and the cost of capital. Instead, conclusions are drawn by comparing long-run trends. Third, the critique is too narrow. By focusing only on profitability, other important dynamics get lost. For example, increases in white wages during the 1960s account for the bulk of the increase in wage share that cut into profits. With income distributions highly skewed along racial lines, increasing white purchasing power could have maintained a domestic market that supported growth.
Perhaps the most important missing variable is a systematic investigation of the impact of institutional and political stability on fixed capital accumulation in South Africa. Distributive outcomes are only one set of factors influencing the process of accumulation arising from competing claims on economic resources. Conflict over the process of distribution can itself impact the rate of investment -independent of the actual level of profitability. Michal Kalecki makes this distinction between distributive outcomes and distributive conflict in his discussion of the politics of full-employment. As an economy approaches full-employment, the bargaining power of labor general rises, as do wages. However, it is the conflict between capital and labor, not a squeeze on profits, which Kalecki considers important. Owners of capital become concerned about maintaining their positions as residual claimants. Expectations of institutional changes that threaten their economic position, therefore, contribute to lowering investment. As Kalecki writes, "'discipline in factories' and 'political stability' are more appreciated by the business leaders than profits" (Kalecki 1971: 141) If a particular distribution of economic resources violates norms of fairness, social tensions could arise as a way of contesting the way the pie is divided. In this way, entrenched inequalities can produce political instability that leads to reduced profit expectations and greater insecurity over property rights. Cross-country empirical evidence supports this relationship between inequalities and political conflict (Schock 1996) . Inequalities need not be limited to the distribution of income, assets, or wealth in order to contribute to social and political unrest. An unequal distribution of political rights, access to basic services (for example, health or education), or social opportunities and human capacities could also contribute to pressures that contribute to conflict. Inequalities among racial and ethnic groups could also fuel unrest.
What is the significance of this distinction for the social structures of accumulation approach? The social structures of accumulation framework emphasizes the stability of institutions and social relations, not simply distributive outcomes, in understanding the dynamics of capital accumulation (Kotz 1990) . Disruptions that damage the integrity, or expectations about the future integrity, of social relations can undermine a regime of accumulation. Arguing that changes in profit rates or profits shares necessarily imply that the underlying institutions cannot sustain a social structure of accumulation misses a central point. Only if sustained trends in observed profitability clearly undermine the institutional supports for a regime of accumulation would this be the case. This is not meant as an argument against the importance of profitability in investment behavior in a capitalist economy. However, the emphasis belongs on the institutional foundations of a particular period in an economy's history, not solely on observe patterns of the distribution of output. 4 Separating the effects of profitability and political unrest provides a clearer picture of the factors behind the South African crisis of accumulation. The first step in this process is to develop a measurement of political instability. The data used to construct such a measure must reflect the character of social conflict in South Africa during the last two decades of the apartheid era. In particular, any index of political unrest should capture both the impact of unrest in the townships and the effect of conflicts at the workplace. In this study, the indicators selected include the average annual prison population of South Africa, the number of persons held in detention without trial under the apartheid security laws 5 , and the number of recorded strikes. Figure 2 4 Empirical research by Gordon, Weisskopf, and Bowles (1998) underscores this argument. In their work on the institutional dynamics of the U.S. in the post-World War II period, they separate out two components of profitability: (1) profitability derived from the power of capitalists and (2) unexpected profitability, not associated with these institutional foundations. They show that estimated investment functions that include both the index of capitalist power and unexpected profitability outperform estimations that only include observed profitability. 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 standardized value prison pop detentions strikes PC Each of these variables could be seen as an imperfect set of observations on a single social variable: the general state of political uncertainty. Therefore, the technique of principal components was used to construct a "best estimate" of the underlying social trend.
6 A more detailed description of this technique is contained in the appendix. Figure  2 shows the index of political unrest and the standardized variables used to construct the index from 1970 to 1992.
7 From Figure 2 , the index of political unrest appears to capture, albeit imperfectly, some important turning points in the resistance to the apartheid regime. For example, the Durban strikes of 1973; the Soweto uprising of 1976; the buildup to the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983; and the state of emergency beginning in 1985 are all associated with local peaks in the index, although the behavior of any single component does not necessarily capture these same patterns. Likewise, the change to the de Klerk administration in 1989 and the negotiated transition to democracy are associated with a decline in the index value.
Trends in the after-tax profit share 8 provide an interesting comparison with the index of political unrest. Figure 3 shows the weighted average of the after-tax profit share for seven industrial sectors of the South African economy from 1970 to 1995. The figure also shows the mining and manufacturing sectors separately. Despite the growing strength of black trade unions and rising black wages beginning in the mid-1970s, no dramatic profit squeeze is evident throughout all sectors of the South African economy. Instead, relatively stable profit shares characterized the crisis years. During this time, a wage compression -in which the relative wages of white workers fell -allowed black wages to grow without cutting into profits. The one possible exception to this pattern of profits shares is the mining sector, which showed a fall in profit share after the speculative bubble in gold burst in 1981. However, the average profit share in the remainder of the 1980s is not markedly different than the average for the early 1970s.
A casual examination of trends does not allow us to say much about the factors influencing accumulation during the crisis years. Instead, formal econometric estimates of the determinants of investment would be needed. In other work, I have estimated just such a model for seven core economic sectors using panel data for the years 1970-93 (Heintz 2001) . Note that because of discontinuities in the panel data, the time period could not be extended further into the past. The dependent variable is the growth rate of non-residential fixed capital stock. Independent variables include the after-tax rate of 6 Other indices of political instability have been developed for South Africa -for example, the innovative index of Fedderke et al. (1998) . Their index contains indicators of township unrest (for example, number of people held in detention) and measurements of state control (for example, number of books censored). Fielding (2001) uses this index in his estimates of manufacturing investment derived from a neoclassical model. However, the index does not include strike activity -an important indicator of social and distributive conflict in South Africa during this period -and uses a highly subjective weighting criterion. Therefore, I chose to develop an alternative index.
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To make Figure 2 more readable, the values of the standardized variables and the index were shifted up by a scalar of two. This moves the trend lines above the horizontal access without distorting the magnitude of the changes from year to year. 8 After-tax profit share for each sector is calculated as (1-ô)(1-L), in which L is the labor share of value added and ô is the average corporate tax rate, estimated as corporate taxes paid as a percent of corporate income. The data come from the Reserve Bank of South Africa and Statistics South Africa. Figure 3 profit, the index of political unrest, an accelerator term (proxied by the rate of growth of real value added), and a measure of the user cost of capital. In addition, the model incorporated fixed effects and the dynamic effect of a lagged endogenous variable. The details of the empirical estimates will not be replicated here (a summary of the results are included in the appendix). Instead, I will focus on the results of this previous work and the implications for a social structures of accumulation analysis for South Africa.
The first column of Table 2 shows the standardized long-run coefficients for the four core determinants of investment -profit rates, political unrest, accelerator effects, and costs of capital. Standardized coefficients show the effect on the rate of capital accumulation of a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The largest standardized effect is associated with the after-tax profit rate, followed closely by the index of political unrest. The standardized coefficient on the accelerator term is somewhat smaller, while the effect of the user cost of capital is practically negligible. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 mining manufacturing all 7 sectors
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In order to determine which variables contributed most to the crisis of accumulation, the second column of Table 1 reports the contribution of each explanatory variable, ceteris paribus, across two different business cycles, one at the beginning of the period in question, 1972-75, and one at the end, 1985-92. 10 When actual changes in the explanatory variables are used to gauge the impact on the rate of accumulation, the largest effect can be attributed to political unrest, independent of the actual distributive outcomes (e.g. profitability). 
Note: The seven sectors are mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, trade, transport & communication, and finance (based on estimates detailed in Heintz 2001).
These results lend support to the argument that political conflict directed at the institutions of apartheid was the driving force behind the crisis of accumulation in South Africa. The falling rate of investment can be linked to uncertainties around the stability of the social relations which structured apartheid. The superior explanatory power of an index of political instability reinforces the use of an approach that incorporates institutional dynamics when investigating the factors behind different patterns of accumulation.
These estimates do not shed much light on how apartheid South Africa was able to sustain high rates of accumulation in the 1950s and 1960s despite declines in the profit rates of key sectors, such as manufacturing. However, a number of factors could explain this apparent inconsistency. First, although falling, profit rates were very high throughout this period. Second, strong rates of economic growth would have helped sustain investment through accelerator effects. Third, investment was not primarily financed through retained earnings in this early period, although beginning in the mid-1970s this no longer remained true. Statistics from the Reserve Bank of South Africa show that business savings averaged 21 percent of total net savings from 1960-69, but rose to an 14 average of 85 percent of total net savings from 1980-89. A greater dependence on intermediated finance for investment in this earlier period could have relaxed the constraints that declines in profitability might have placed on accumulation.
A set of simple regression results supports this line of reasoning. Table 3 presents regression coefficient estimates and correlation coefficients between two sets of variables: (1) gross domestic investment and business savings and (2) investment and corporate operating surplus.
11 The summary statistics are calculated for two periods, 1960-76 (when household savings accounted for a majority of net savings) and 1977-94 (when business savings accounted for the majority of savings). Gross investment, business savings, and corporate operating surplus are all normalized by expressing the variables as a percentage of GDP. In the earlier period, there was a small, positive degree of correlation between business savings and investment and between corporate operating surplus and investment. In the later period, the size of the correlation coefficients jumped up dramatically. In addition, neither of the estimated coefficients was significant in the earlier time period. In the later period, however, both coefficients are statistically significant. It is important to recall that key financial institutions helped provide a source of intermediated finance on favorable terms during the early decades of apartheid. They came from both the banking sector -e.g. Volkskas -and the insurance sector -e.g. Sanlam. This institutional support would have reduced the dependence on retained earnings as a source of finance and reduced the impact of changes in profitability on observed patterns of accumulation.
To sum up: a careful and rigorous examination of the determinants of investment shows that the narrow debate about profitability ignores the larger picture and can lead to misleading conclusions. It was the uncertainty caused by political unrest which led to the dramatic fall in the rate of investment. These results support the argument that the institutional foundation, not a particular income distribution per se, supported the high rates of accumulation that the South African economy enjoyed during the first two 15 decades of apartheid. A natural next step is to take the empirical results presented here and apply the analysis to the post-apartheid period.
IV. Current South African macroeconomic policypolitical democracy and economic liberalization
In resolving the crisis of accumulation of the final decades of apartheid, South Africa faced the twin challenges of restoring political stability and adopting economic policies to revitalize investment. The transition to democracy would go a long way towards stabilizing the domestic political situation and improving the country's international reputation. However, as the discussion of the determinants of investment in the previous section showed, accumulation in South Africa depends on profitability as well as social stability. This poses a strategic difficulty for a democratic transition in a country with a legacy of vast inequalities and unmet social needs. Truly democratic institutions could create pressures for redistribution that would threaten future profitability. The mechanism for redistribution could easily extend beyond a tax-andspend fiscal strategy. For example, the African National Congress (ANC) had formed a political alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) raising the possibility that labor-government cooperation could shift the future policy environment in the favor of workers.
One solution to this tension -and the one that was eventually adopted in South Africa -is to allow relatively unhindered markets to adjudicate distributive conflicts. In effect, the strategy would extend liberal democratic rights to all people in the political sphere while relying on market-determined outcomes in the economic sphere. Economic liberalization would limit the extent to which competing claims on South Africa's economic resources would affect incentives for capital accumulation. Take the example of real wages. By liberalizing labor markets and maintaining a high degree of "flexibility," wage demands and efforts to improve standards could be kept in check by the specter of growing unemployment. Likewise, by drastically reducing restrictions on trade and capital flows, redistributive policies would be more difficult to pursue without compromising the country's competitiveness or risking capital flight.
The idea that macroeconomic policy is endogenous to efforts by states to curb redistributive pressures has been applied to other contexts (e.g. Boddy and Crotty 1975) . In South Africa, this approach to economic policy is best summed up in the Department of Finance's macroeconomic framework -Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) -released in June 1996. The strategy proposed a set of medium-term policies aimed at the rapid liberalization of the South African economy. These policies included a relaxation of exchange controls, trade liberalization, "regulated" flexibility in labor markets, deficit reduction targets, and monetary policies aimed at stabilizing the rand through market interest rates. Another component of the strategy -the privatization of state assets -was being negotiated through an agreement between government and labor, called the National Framework Agreement (NFA). Taken together, these policies reflect a fairly standard package of free-market macroeconomic adjustments.
The argument behind the GEAR strategy was that these policies would stabilize the economic environment in South Africa and create a favorable climate for investment. The framework adopted a profit-led growth argument, stressing that productivity increases must exceed real wage gains in order to promote investment (i.e. a shift in distribution away from the labor share was implicit). The GEAR strategy welcomed increases in government spending and wages -but only in the context of sustained economic growth and productivity increases. This constrained many efforts at raising living standards and pursuing public investments, outside of budget reprioritization, until a time when growth was firmly established. In this regard, GEAR was optimistic, predicting sustained growth of 6 percent and an annual rate of increase of over 400,000 new jobs by the year 2000.
The separation between democratic institutions and macroeconomic policies was made explicit with the release of this macroeconomic strategy. At the time of the announcement of the framework in June 1996, GEAR was declared non-negotiable. Ironically, a tripartite institution -the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) -had been established the previous year in order to allow government, organized business, and labor to negotiate the details of national economic and labor market policies. One of the four negotiating chambers of Nedlac -the Monetary Policy and Public Finance chamber -was specifically established to promote stakeholder discussions of macroeconomic issues. However, the declaration that the GEAR strategy was non-negotiable effectively eliminated any input from Nedlac.
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The free-market approach of GEAR should be seen in a historical context. Democratic reforms to apartheid often coincided with liberal, more market-oriented, economic policies. For example, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, then president P.W. Botha pursued a number of reforms, such as the legalization of black trade unions, the establishment of parliamentary structures for the Indian and Coloured populations, the removal of prohibitions on mixed marriages, and the de-racialization of some aspects of public social life (Morris and Padayachee 1988) . These reforms can be seen as a limited adoption of more democratic practices, although still within the larger system of apartheid. These changes were accompanied by more market-oriented economic policies -a reform of monetary policy to embrace market-determined interest rates, a brief removal of exchange controls , and a liberalization of labor markets with the elimination of influx controls and job reservations. Furthermore, during the negotiated transition to democracy under de Klerk (1989-94) , additional policies of economic liberalization were pursued (Gelb 1991) .
Has the strategy of securing social stability through political democracy and economic stability through market-oriented liberalization worked in terms of establishing a new, post-apartheid, social structure of accumulation? In many respects, it is still too early to tell. However, a review of South Africa's economic performance since 1994 -and, in particularly, since the adoption of the GEAR policy in 1996 -raises some significant concerns. Table 4 summaries these recent macroeconomic trends. While the macroeconomic strategy has been successfully in reducing inflation and lowering the South African budget deficit, growth rates lag far behind the optimistic forecasts put forward in the GEAR document. Downward pressure on the value of the rand combined with deflationary monetary policies caused real interest rates to rise during this period. Private sector employment has exhibited a pattern of "jobless growth" in which low growth rates have been associated with a decline in the number of formal sector jobs. This has caused South Africa's already high unemployment rate to climb still higher. In addition, per capita income has stagnated over this period and labor's share of value-added has generally fallen -consistent with the profit-led growth strategy of GEAR.
Has economic liberalization laid the groundwork for a new social structure of accumulation in democratic South Africa? There is little evidence to support any such claim. The rate of accumulation of fixed capital stock is on par with the average rate of accumulation of the crisis years of apartheid. While the growth rate of the after-tax profit rate has generally been positive and averaged 1.9 percent from 1994 to 2000, a revitalization of investment is not apparent.
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These trends in economic performance raise some important concerns about the ability of a standard policy package of economic liberalization to provide the basis for on-going expansion and accumulation. In particular, the issue of providing a stable political, institutional and economic environment becomes an important consideration. While the introduction of democratic rights has eliminated the political unrest associated with the struggle against apartheid, sources of instability remain. Sustained inequalities in the distribution of wages, assets, and income could lead to future political unrest, as the current situation in Zimbabwe reminds us. South African trade unions have mobilized against the use of economic liberalization, privatization, and labor market flexibility as a way of resolving distributive conflict, arguing that such strategies could worsen inequalities. Moreover, widespread poverty and an extremely unequal income distribution have proved to be a fertile ground for the growth of crime -a major source of social instability.
Economic liberalization has also been associated with a higher degree of macroeconomic uncertainty in terms of key prices such as exchange rates. For example, the standard deviation of the rand exchange rate (R/$US) during the post-apartheid years, 1994-2000, was 1.44; during the decade prior to the first elections, 1984-93, the standard deviation was just 0.46.
14 In addition, the slow government response to the HIV/AIDS crisis has made the future of millions of South Africans even more tenuous -raising questions about the future labor force and who will raise the next generation of South Africans. Taken together, these factors will undermine the ability of economic liberalization to revitalize capital accumulation.
Finally, free-market policies will likely worsen income inequalities. A principal distributive outcome of the apartheid system was the sustained expansion of the wealth of a small minority of South Africans. This concentration of asset ownership has important implications for the relative power of different players in market exchanges. Individuals with large endowments of wealth enjoy a more secure fallback position than those with few or no assets. In addition, owners of assets can threaten to sanction a less well endowed party in an exchange in which markets are not perfect and contracts are not costlessly enforceable (Bowles and Gintis 1993) . For example, the threat from employers to terminate an employee's job is often a more credible sanction than a threat from the employee to quit, particularly in a context of widespread unemployment. Therefore, the ability of wealth-holders to secure favorable outcomes in market exchanges is enhanced when asset distribution is highly skewed. In such an environment, the undemocratic side of market institutions is enhanced as inequalities become more pronounced.
In 1998, the South African economy showed a marked decline in its average profit rate. The effects of the global financial crises of that year, particularly in East Asia and Russia, probably contributed to this decline. By 2000, the profit rate had recovered. 14 Based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics, various years.
V. Concluding discussion
In this paper, I have argued that an institutional analysis of investment along the lines of the social structures of accumulation approach remains an insightful tool for understanding patterns of capital accumulation in apartheid South Africa, during the crisis years, and following the democratic transition. In the past, such an approach failed to take into account important empirical evidence -most significantly, the rate of profit in the South African economy. This paper has shown that focusing only on distributive outcomes (i.e. profitability) is misleading. The most important variable in explaining the South African crisis of accumulation is the degree of political conflict and institutional uncertainty. Despite the central role played by political unrest, however, profitability remains a significant determinant of investment. The perceived tensions between democratic reforms to restore social stability and investment-friendly distributive outcomes have determined the direction of macroeconomic strategies in democratic South Africa.
If economic liberalization and free market policies cannot resolve distributive conflicts in such a way as to promote growth and investment, then what are the alternatives for South Africa to develop a viable regime of accumulation consistent with the democratic ideals outlined in the country's new constitution? While a full discussion of alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper, a number of possibilities suggest themselves. For example, an emphasis on public investment in infrastructure, education, and fighting AIDS -as opposed to sticking to arbitrary deficit targets -could contribute to improved profitability, greater economic activity, and more stable communities, all of which would have a positive impact on investment. Likewise, liberalization of trade and financial markets would not remain short-to medium-run priorities. Instead, regulatory protections, such as a redesign of capital controls, could be used to stabilize the macroeconomic environment. A stronger commitment to resolving distributive conflicts through bargaining institutions -for example, the Nedlac process and workplace forums -could improve stakeholder relationships. Finally, a greater emphasis on asset redistribution policies (such as a comprehensive land reform) would also help alleviate distributive conflicts.
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Strategies along these lines could prove more effective in establishing a new regime of accumulation and growth than the current emphasis on economic liberalization. However, globalization and the need to create good governance structures pose important challenges for the implementation of an alternative framework. In particular, the ability to establish strong, effective, and stable institutions for resolving distributive conflicts would determine the success or failure of such an alternative. How viable such an approach would be in a small, open economy operating within a globalized world remains to be seen.
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The issues raised in this paper are not unique to South Africa. Numerous countries around the globe have experienced democratic transitions in recent years -for example, El Salvador, Brazil, South Korea, Nigeria, Mozambique, Namibia, and much of Eastern Europe. At the same time, policies of economic liberalization and free-market reforms have been pursued throughout the world. Increasingly, market institutions have been adjudicating distributive conflicts, making redistributive strategies for economic growth more difficult to implement. In addition, the ability of market-based strategies to secure a stable institutional environment for accumulation is questionable -both in terms of social and macroeconomic stability. Limiting democratic reforms to an extension of political rights, while excluding more democratic means of resolving distributive conflicts, could likely be the wrong economic policy, not only for South Africa, but for many other countries as well. Alesina and Perotti (1996) used the technique of using principal components to capture political instability in a cross-sectional setting. A similar approach can be used to generate a context-specific index for a particular country over times. The technique of principal components reduces the dimensionality of a matrix of observations (X) on a common economic phenomenon -in this case, political unrest. The first principal component minimizes tr(X-p 1 v 1 ) (X-p 1 v 1 ) in which v 1 is the eigenvector of the X X matrix associated with the largest eigenvalue. The first principal component, therefore, reflects the "best" linear summary of the component variables in the sense of minimizing the sum of squared deviations and maximizing the captured variation of the component variables. Therefore, the first principal component was taken as the index of political unrest. Because it minimizes squared deviations, the principal component technique is seen as superior to other linear combinations of variables (e.g. averaging the variables) that could be used to summarize multiple observations on an underlying social trend. Note that all the component variables must be standardized in order to calculate the principal components. Without standardization, the variable that has the largest numercial size would dominant all other components.
Appendix -The technique of principal components
In the estimation of the investment function described in this paper, the index of political unrest was included among other determinants of investment. Three primary sources of data are used for all empirical estimations: (1) the Reserve Bank of South Africa, (2) Statistics South Africa, and (3) the Survey of Race Relations. The Reserve Bank produces time series data that include national accounts variables, interest rates, fixed capital stock, and investment information. Statistics South Africa maintains data on labor market outcomes, including wages, employment, industrial disputes, and price indices. The Survey of Race Relations provides data on indicators of social and political unrest. From these sources, I compile a panel data set for the time period 1970-1993 (1970-92 for lagged variables) with cross-sections of the private, non-agricultural formal sectors of the economy.
The dependent variable for all estimations of the investment function is the sectoral rate of change of the real, non-residential fixed capital stock. Profitability enters as a primary explanatory variable in the behavior model developed in the prior section. Operating surplus is normalized by the size of the fixed capital stock in order to produce a proxy for the sectoral rate of profit. In order to account for the effect of business taxation, the profit rate is adjusted downward by a factor of 1-ô, where ô is the average rate of taxation on business income less interest and rent payments. The user cost of capital, ñ, used in the regression analysis was developed by Peter Fallon and Robert Lucas. 16 Capacity utilization estimates are difficult to generate for South Africa because of the lack of good time series data that could be used to construct reasonable estimates.
16
Data for this World Bank user cost of capital index was kindly supplied by Peter Fallon. Fallon and Lucas (1998) estimated labor demand relationships for South Africa, incorporating this measure of capital cost into their analysis. Therefore, the lagged rate of change of real value added for each industrial sector will be used as a proxy for changes in capacity utilization in the econometric estimates.
Since the data possesses both cross-sectional and time series dimensions, the estimations use fixed effects to estimate the investment relationships. In equations containing a lagged endogenous variable, the existence of auto-correlated error terms introduces problems of endogeneity. To address this, an instrumental variable technique is incorporated into the fixed effects estimation, using lagged exogenous variables to construct an instrument. Corrections for first-order autocorrelation follow the two-step method developed by Hatanaka (1974) . Table A1 summarizes the estimates of the investment function for South Africa. Table 2 in the text is based on the estimates of Equation 3. 1971-1993, t-statistics in parentheses (n=154) . 
